Monetary Economics in Globalised Financial Markets

von: Ansgar Belke, Thorsten Polleit

Springer-Verlag, 2011

ISBN: 9783540710035 , 833 Seiten

Format: PDF, OL

Kopierschutz: Wasserzeichen

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Monetary Economics in Globalised Financial Markets


 

Preface

6

Contents

8

1 Money and Credit Supply

15

1.1 Money Definition, Functions, Kinds and Origin

15

1.1.1 Definition and Functions

15

1.1.2 Kinds of Money

20

1.1.3 Origin of Money

22

1.2 From the Gold to the Paper Money Standard

25

1.2.1 The Gold Standard

25

1.2.2 Gold Standard and the Price Level

28

1.2.3 Trade, Gold Movements, Prices and Income

28

1.2.4 Pros and Cons of the Gold Standard

30

1.2.5 The End of the Gold Standard

32

1.3 Money and Credit Creation

33

1.3.1 Base Money Supply

33

1.3.2 Central Bank Balance Sheet

36

1.3.3 The US Federal Reserve

37

1.3.3.1 Asset Side of the Balance Sheet

37

1.3.3.2 Liability Side of the Balance Sheet

38

1.3.3.3 Calculating the Monetary Base

40

1.3.4 The Eurosystem

41

1.3.4.1 Asset Side of the Balance Sheet

41

1.3.4.2 Liability Side of the Balance Sheet

41

1.3.4.3 Illustration

42

1.3.5 Credit and Money Creation

43

1.3.6 Multiple Credit and Money Creation

44

1.3.7 The Tinbergen Approach to the Money Multiplier

48

1.3.8 Open Market Operations

52

1.3.8.1 Open Market Operations in the US

52

1.3.8.2 Open Market Operations in the Euro Area

54

1.3.8.3 Example: The ECB's Variable and Fixed Tender Procedure

55

1.3.9 A Closer Look at the Demand for Base Money

59

1.3.9.1 Re (i): Minimum Reserves

59

1.3.9.2 Re (ii): Cash Drain

61

1.3.9.3 Re (iii): Working Balances

62

1.3.10 Supply of and Demand for Base Money

63

1.3.11 Impact of Short- on Long-Term Rates

67

1.3.12 Exogenous Versus Endogenous Money Supply

69

1.3.12.1 The Statistical Issue

69

1.3.12.2 The Theoretical Issue

71

1.4 Money Aggregates

72

1.4.1 International Definitions of Money Aggregates

72

1.4.1.1 United States

72

1.4.1.2 Euro Area

75

1.4.1.3 Japan

79

1.4.1.4 Switzerland

80

1.5 Digression : Divisia Monetary Aggregates

80

1.4.1 Weak Separability of Utility Functions

82

1.4.1 Constructing a Divisia Monetary Aggregate

83

1.5 Impact of Portfolio Shifts on Money

85

1.5.1 Autonomous Bank Refinancing

85

1.5.2 Bank Refinancing Via Selling Assets

86

1.5.3 Disintermediation

87

1.5.4 Inversion of the Yield Curve

88

1.6 A Look at Global Liquidity

90

1.6.1 Calculating a Global Liquidity Aggregate

91

1.6.2 The Effects of Cross-Border Selling of National Currency on National Monetary Aggregates

93

1.7 Digression : Key Facts About Major Central Banks

94

1.6.2 The US Federal Reserve System

94

1.6.2.0 Objectives

94

1.6.2.0 Federal Reserve Open Market Committee

94

1.6.2.0 Meetings and Proceedings of the FOMC

95

1.6.2 European Central Bank

96

1.6.2.0 Objectives

96

1.6.2.0 ECB, ESCB and Eurosystem

96

1.6.2.0 Decision Making Bodies

96

1.6.2.0 Meetings and Communication

98

1.6.2 Bank of Japan

98

1.6.2.0 Objectives

98

1.6.2.0 Decision Making Bodies

98

1.6.2.0 Meetings and Communication

99

1.6.2 Bank of England

99

1.6.2.0 Objectives

99

1.6.2.0 Committees

100

1.6.2.0 Meetings and Communication

100

2 Money and Credit Demand

105

2.1 Classical Demand for Money Theory

105

2.1.1 The Cambridge Approach

106

2.1.2 The Role of Wealth in the Transaction Approach

107

2.2 Keynesian Money Demand Theory

110

2.2.1 Explaining the Trend of Income Velocity of Money

115

2.2.2 Some Empirically Testable Money Demand Hypotheses

115

2.3 Portfolio Oriented Money Demand Theory

118

2.3.1 Monetarist Money Demand

118

2.3.2 Post-Keynesian Money Demand Theory

120

2.3.2.1 Inventory Model Approach to Transaction Balances

120

2.3.2.2 Tobin's Demand for Speculative Balances

123

2.3.2.3 Re (i): Change in Expected Return

126

2.3.2.4 Re (ii): Change in Risk

127

2.3.2.5 Re (iii): Increase in Taxes

128

2.4 Digression: Income Velocities of US Monetary Aggregates

129

2.4 Money-in-the-Utility Function and Cash-In-Advance Models of Money Demand

132

2.4.1 Money-in-the-Utility Function of Money Demand

133

2.4.2 Cash-in-Advance Models of Money Demand

134

2.5 Estimating Money Demand Functions for the US and the Euro Area

136

2.5.1 Money Demand in the US

136

2.5.2 Euro Area Money Demand 1980-Q1 to 2001-Q4

144

2.5.3 Euro Area Money Demand 1980-Q1 to 2006-Q1

149

2.6 Credit Demand

153

3 Interest Rate Theories

165

3.1 Introductory Remarks

165

3.2 The Austrian Theory of the Interest Rate

167

3.3 The Neo-Classical Theory of the Interest Rate

174

3.3.1 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint

174

3.3.2 The Intertemporal Production Frontier (IPPF)

176

3.3.3 Determining the Market Interest Rate

178

3.3.4 Sum of the Parts: the Neo-Classical Interest Rate

183

3.4 Knut Wicksells Theory of the Interest Rate

185

3.4.1 Wicksell's Loanable Funds Theory

186

3.4.2 The Concept of the Real Neutral Interest Rate

190

3.4.2.1 Time Preferences

191

3.4.2.2 Productivity and Population Growth

191

3.4.2.3 Fiscal Policy and Risk Premia

191

3.4.2.4 Institutional Structure of Financial Markets

193

3.4.3 Estimating the Natural Real Interest Rate

194

3.4.3.1 Long-Term Averages of Actual Real Interest Rates

194

3.4.3.2 Real Yields of Inflation Index Bonds

198

3.4.3.3 Time Series Models

198

3.4.3.4 Structural Models

199

3.5 The Keynesian Liquidity Preference Theory

199

3.6 Nominal Versus Real Interest Rates

201

3.7 Credit Spreads

203

4 Financial Market Asset Pricing

208

4.1 Prices, Returns and Distributions

208

4.1.1 Prices and Returns

208

4.1.1.1 Holding Period Returns

208

4.1.1.2 Compounding Returns

209

4.1.1.3 Continuous Compounding

210

4.1.2 Joint, Marginal, Conditional and Unconditional Distributions

211

4.1.2.1 Joint Probability Density Function (PDF)

212

4.1.2.2 Marginal PDF

212

4.1.2.3 Conditional and Unconditional PDF

213

4.1.2.4 Statistical Independence

213

4.1.2.5 Continuous Joint PDF

214

4.1.2.6 Random Variables and the Normal PDF

214

4.1.2.7 From the Unconditional to the Log-Normal Distribution

216

4.1.2.8 The Lognormal Distribution

216

4.2 Stylised Facts for International Asset Price Linkages

218

4.2.1 Latest Developments

218

4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics and Some Tests

222

4.2.2.1 Empirical Findings for International Asset Returns

225

4.2.3 Measuring International Asset Return Linkages

226

4.2.3.1 Re (i): Causality

227

4.2.3.2 Re (ii): Co-Movement of Various Asset Prices

230

4.2.3.3 Re (iii): Convergence of Asset Prices and Valuations

238

4.2.3.4 Some Empirical Estimation

239

4.3 Digression: Price Earnings Ratios and Future Stock Market Performance

245

4.2.3 Long-Run Relation Between International Bond Yields

249

4.3 Rational Expectations and the Efficient Market Hypothesis

250

4.3.1 Formalising the EMH

254

4.3.2 Orthogonality Property

254

4.3.3 Random Walk

255

4.3.4 No Abnormal Returns

256

4.3.5 Market Relevant Information

257

4.4 Bond Valuation Basic Valuation Concepts

259

4.4.1 Prices, Yields and the RVF

259

4.4.1.1 Terminal Value of Investment

259

4.4.1.2 Discounted Present Value (DPV)

261

4.4.1.3 Time Value of Money

262

4.4.1.4 Pure Discount Bonds and Spot Yields

262

4.4.1.5 Coupon Paying Bonds

263

4.4.1.6 Spot Rates

265

4.4.1.7 Approximating Spot Rates from Coupon Paying Bonds

265

4.4.1.8 Forward Rates

266

4.4.1.9 Holding Period Yield (HPY) and the Rational Valuation Formula (RVF)

268

4.4.1.10 Duration

269

4.4.1.11 Nominal Versus Real Values

274

4.4.2 Theories of the Term Structure of Interest Rates

276

4.4.2.1 Theories of the Term Structure of Interest Rates Using the HPY

276

4.5 Digression: The Information Content of the US Term Spread for Future Economic Activity

280

4.4.2 Explaining the Term Structure of Interest Rates Using Spot Yields

284

4.4.2.1 The PEH and Spot Yields

285

4.4.2.1 PEH: Tests Using Different Maturities

286

4.4.3 The Term Structure Spread and Future Short-Term Rate Changes

287

4.5 Stock Valuation

290

4.5.1 Discounted Cash Flow Under EMH-RE

291

4.5.1.1 Stock Valuation

291

4.5.1.2 RVF for Stocks with Constant Expected Returns

291

4.5.1.3 Gordon's Constant Dividend Growth Model

293

4.5.1.4 Gordon's Dividend Growth Model with Variations in Dividend Growth

294

4.5.1.5 Excess Volatility of Stock Prices (''Variance Bounds'')

295

4.5.2 Dividend Yields, Expected Returns and the Campbell-Shiller Model

302

4.5.2.1 Dividends Yields and Expected Returns

302

4.5.2.2 The Campbell-Shiller Model

303

4.5.2.3 An Empirical Application of the Campbell-Shiller Model

307

4.5.2.4 Some Words of Caution: Data Persistence and the Quality of Long-Horizon Forecasts

312

4.6 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)

314

4.6.1 Portfolio Selection Theory

315

4.6.2 Model of the Capital Market Line (CML)

318

4.6.3 Two-Fund Separation Theorem

319

4.6.4 The Capital Asset Pricing Model

319

4.6.5 Estimating the Beta-Factor

322

4.7 Liquidity Provision A Theoretical Framework

325

4.7.1 The Financial System as a Private Provider of Liquidity

326

4.7.2 Financial Fragility and Cash-in-the-Market Pricing

328

4.7.3 Contagion

329

4.7.4 Asymmetric Information

330

5 Causes, Costs and Benefits of Sound Money

337

5.1 The Objective of Price Stability

337

5.1.1 The Index Regime -- Measuring Price Stability

338

5.1.2 Headline Versus Core Indices

339

5.1.3 Predictive Power of Core Inflation

341

5.1.4 Role of Core Inflation in Monetary Policy

342

5.1.5 International Definitions of Price Stability

345

5.1.6 Inflation Versus Price Level Objective

350

5.1.7 Price Level Stability and Positive Supply-Side Shocks

353

5.1.7.1 Re (i): Supply Shock Without Policy Intervention

353

5.1.7.2 Re (ii): Supply Shock with Policy Intervention

354

5.1.7.3 Conclusion

354

5.1.8 Inflation Versus Price Level Targeting in a Simple Phillips Curve Model

354

5.1.8.1 Some Simulations

357

5.1.8.2 Conclusion

359

5.1.9 A Brief Look at Inflation History

359

5.2 Causes of Inflation

360

5.2.1 Monetary Inflation Theory

361

5.2.1.1 The Equation of Exchange

361

5.2.1.2 Money Growth and Inflation

366

5.2.1.3 The Information Content of Money in a Low Inflation Environment

371

5.2.1.4 The Concept of ''Core Money'' and ''Core Inflation''

372

5.2.1.5 Cagan's Model of Prices, Money and Hyperinflation

377

5.2.2 Non-Monetary Inflation Theory

380

5.2.2.1 One-Off Price Level Effect Versus Inflation

382

5.2.2.2 Do ''Models Without Money'' Explain Inflation as a Non-Monetary Phenomenon?

384

5.2.3 Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

386

5.2.3.1 Weak Form Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

387

5.2.3.2 Strong Form Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

388

5.2.3.3 How Much Price Stability Is Desirable?

389

5.2.3.4 Does the FTPL Provide Useful Input into the Design of Socially Efficient Policies?

390

5.2.3.5 What Insights Does the FTPL Provide in the End? A Critical Assessment

391

5.3 Costs and Benefits of Inflation

393

5.3.1 Costs of Inflation

393

5.3.1.1 Costs of Non-Anticipated Inflation

394

5.3.1.2 Costs of Anticipated Inflation

396

5.3.1.3 Inflation -- A Collective Societal Evil

397

5.3.2 Benefits of Inflation -- The Phillips Curve

401

5.3.2.1 The Traditional Phillips Curve

402

5.3.2.2 The Modified Phillips Curve

402

5.3.2.3 Expectation Based Phillips Curve

405

5.3.2.4 The Hysteresis-Based Phillips Curve

406

5.3.2.5 Why Is the Use of Full-Fledged Hysteresis Models So Attractive for Monetary Policy Consulting?

410

5.3.3 A Path-Dependent Long-Run Phillips Curve -- The Case of Hysteresis

412

5.3.3.1 Introduction

412

5.3.3.2 The Micro Model Under Certainty

414

5.3.3.3 Macro Level: An Aggregation Approach

417

5.3.3.4 The Micro Model Under One-Off Uncertainty and the Possibility of Waiting

421

5.3.3.5 Aggregation to the Macro Level Under Uncertainty

423

5.3.3.6 Conclusions and Implications for Monetary Policy

428

5.3.3.7 Monetary Policy and Investment Decisions -- A Stylized Treatment of the Uncertainty Trap

429

5.3.4 Monetary Policy and the Phillips Curve

433

5.3.4.1 Monetary Policy Under a Keynesian Phillips-Curve

433

5.3.4.2 Monetary Policy Under a Monetarist Phillips-Curve

434

5.3.4.3 Monetary Policy Under a Neo-Classical Phillips-Curve

435

5.3.4.4 Re (iv): Neo-Keynesian Phillips-Curve

438

5.3.4.5 Re (v): Monetary Policy Under a Hysteretic Long-Run Phillips Curve

438

5.3.4.6 Summary

440

5.3.4.7 Monetary Policy, the Phillips Curve and Partisan Political Business Cycles

440

5.4 Optimal Inflation

443

5.5 Deflation

446

5.5.1 Demand and Supply Shocks and Deflation

450

5.5.1.1 Keynesian Investment Trap

451

5.5.1.2 Keynesian Liquidity Trap

452

5.5.1.3 The Case Against (Persistent) Deflation

453

5.5.2 Debt-Deflation Theories

454

5.5.2.1 Fisher's Debt-Deflation Theory

455

5.5.2.2 Mises' Deflation Theory

459

5.5.2.3 Minsky's Debt Deflation Theory

460

5.5.2.4 Bernanke's Debt Deflation Theory

461

5.6 Asset Price Inflation

461

5.6.1 From ''Bubbles'' to Asset Price Inflation

461

5.6.2 Keeping Track of Asset Price Inflation

465

5.6.2.1 The Role Asset Prices Play in the Transmission Mechanism

465

5.6.2.2 The Role of Financial Asset Prices for the Stability of the Financial System

465

5.6.2.3 The Use of Assets Prices as Information and Indicator Variables

467

5.6.2.4 The Discussion About Including Asset Prices in the Monetary Policy Objective

471

5.6.2.5 Discussion

475

6 Theory of Monetary Policy

491

6.1 Uncertainty in Monetary Policy Making

491

6.1.1 Model Uncertainty

493

6.1.2 Data Uncertainty

495

6.2 The Debate About Rules Versus Discretion

498

6.2.1 Arguments in Favour of Monetary Policy Discretion

499

6.2.2 Arguments in Favour of Rules

499

6.3 The Time Inconsistency Problem

500

6.3.1 Time Inconsistency in a Two-Period Model

502

6.3.2 Time Inconsistency in a Multi-Period Model

505

6.3.3 Alternative Solutions to Inflation Bias

508

6.3.3.1 The Concept of a Conservative Central Banker

508

6.3.3.2 Optimal Contracts for Central Banker

509

6.3.3.3 Implementing Economic Reforms

509

6.3.4 Conflicting Views on the Relation Between the Degree of Monetary Policy Autonomy and Structural Reforms

511

6.3.5 A Benchmark Model

515

6.3.6 Results from the Benchmark Model I: Credible Commitment to a Strict Monetary Policy Rule

517

6.3.7 Autonomy Results from the Benchmark Model II: Discretion and Time Inconsistency of Optimal Monetary Policy

518

6.3.8 Welfare Comparisons of Different Monetary Policy Regimes

520

6.3.9 Putting the Model into Perspective: Conditions for More Reforms Under a Discretionary Regime

521

6.3.10 Conditions Favoring More Reforms Under a Rule-Based Regime

522

6.3.11 Extension to the Open Economy Case

523

6.4 Institutions for Safeguarding Price Stability

536

6.4.1 The Way Towards Central Bank Independence

537

6.4.2 Dimensions of Central Bank Independence

540

6.4.3 Measuring Independence

541

6.4.4 Empirical Evidence

542

6.5 The Relation Between Fiscal and Monetary Policy

543

6.5.1 The Government's Single-Period Budget Constraint

544

6.5.2 Seigniorage and the Budget Constraint

545

6.5.3 Inflation and the Single-Period Budget Constraint

546

6.5.4 The Limits to Seignorage Deficit Financing

547

6.5.5 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint

548

6.5.6 The Government Debt Dynamics

552

6.5.7 Extension of the Analysis

553

6.5.8 Consolidation Efforts

555

6.5.9 When Does It Become a ''Ponzi Game''?

557

6.6 Digression : The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council

557

6.5.9 Introduction

557

6.5.9 Minimum Representation: The ECB's Reform Proposal

560

6.5.9 How to Apply the Power Index Concept

562

6.5.9 Results

568

6.5.9.0 Relative Voting Share and Power in the Reformed ECB Council

568

6.5.9.0 Comparison with the Status Quo: One Person, One Vote

573

6.5.9.0 An Assessment of Principle of Representativeness

578

6.5.9 Conclusions and Potential for Further Research

581

7 Transmission Mechanisms

593

7.1 The Effects of Changes in Money Supply

593

7.1.1 Interest Rate Channel

596

7.1.2 Asset Price Channel

599

7.1.2.1 The Role of the Stock in the Transmission Process

599

7.1.2.2 Real Estate Prices

607

7.1.3 Credit Channel

609

7.1.3.1 Bank Lending Channel

609

7.1.3.2 Firm Balance Sheet Channel

610

7.1.4 Credit Rationing

611

7.2 Digression : The Financial Crisis of 2007/2008 Overview and Policy Lessons

617

7.1.4 Symptoms and Chronicle of the Credit Crisis

619

7.1.4 Real Effects of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Is It a Demand or a Finance Shock?

625

7.1.4 Monetary Policy Before and During the Subprime Crisis

625

7.1.4 Does Liquidity Provision Help at All?

626

7.1.4 Did Monetary Policy Trigger the Credit Crisis?

626

7.1.4 How to Avoid Planting the Seeds of the Next Crisis?

627

7.1.4 What Kind of Research Program Should Be Drawn from the Financial Crisis?

628

7.1.4.0 Role of Liquidity in the Credit Crisis-- Cash-in-the Market Pricing

629

7.1.4.0 The Effects on Interbank Markets and Collateralized Markets

630

7.1.4.0 Fear of Contagion

630

7.1.5 Exchange Rate Channel

633

7.1.5.1 Exchange Rate Effects on Net Exports

634

7.1.5.2 Exchange Rate Effects on Balance Sheets

634

7.2 Theory of Crisis: The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle

634

7.3 The Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) Model A Benchmark for Analysing Transmission Mechanisms

636

7.3.1 Overview on VAR Models

637

7.3.2 Technicalities of the VAR Model

638

7.3.3 Imposing Restrictions

639

7.3.4 Impulse Response Functions

640

7.3.5 A Simple VAR Model for the US

642

7.4 Digression : Global Liquidity and the Dynamic Pattern of Price Adjustment: A VAR Analysis for OECD Countries

645

7.3.5 Motivation

645

7.3.5 The Global Perspective of Monetary Transmission

646

7.3.5 The Price Adjustment Process

648

7.3.5 Empirical Analysis

650

7.3.5.0 Data Description and Aggregation Issues

650

7.3.5.0 The VAR Methodology Again

652

7.3.5 Empirical Findings

655

7.3.5.0 The Baseline Model

655

7.3.5.0 Augmenting the VAR with Gold and Stocks

658

7.3.5 Robustness Checks

661

7.3.5 Conclusions

662

7.3.5 How Has the Euro Changed the Monetary Transmission?

662

7.4 Monetary Policy and the Zero Bound to Nominal Interest Rates

663

7.4.1 Alternative Channels for Monetary Policy

665

7.4.1.1 Increasing the Quantity of Money

665

7.4.1.2 Increasing Inflation (Expectations)

670

7.4.1.3 Lessons to Be Learned from the Zero Bound Nominal Interest Rate Discussion

671

8 Monetary Policy Strategies

678

8.1 Strategy Requirements

678

8.1.1 On the Monetary Policy Strategy

678

8.1.2 Intermediate Variable

680

8.1.3 A Model for Intermediate Targeting

681

8.1.3.1 Optimal Interest Rate Policy

682

8.1.3.2 Optimal Money Supply

683

8.1.3.3 Responding to the Actual Stock of Money

684

8.1.3.4 The Emergence of Several Shocks Under Intermediate Targeting

684

8.1.3.5 Interest Rate Rule Under Intermediate Targeting

685

8.2 Monetary Targeting (MT)

686

8.2.1 Money Growth Targets

687

8.2.2 The Income Velocity of Money

690

8.2.3 Inflation Indicators -- Measures of Excess Liquidity

691

8.2.4 The Price Gap

692

8.2.4.1 A Constant Money Growth Rate and the Role of Money Growth Seen in the Past

694

8.2.4.2 The Price Gap and Money Demand

695

8.2.5 The Real Money Gap

696

8.2.6 The Nominal Money Gap

696

8.2.7 The Monetary Overhang

697

8.2.8 Comparisons of the Measures of Excess Liquidity

697

8.2.9 The Difference Between the Nominal Money Gap and the Monetary Overhang

698

8.2.10 The Difference Between the Nominal Money Gap and the Real Money Gap

699

8.3 Inflation Targeting (IT)

707

8.3.1 The Role of the Inflation Forecast Under IT

710

8.3.1.1 Inflation Forecast Assuming Unchanged Official Interest Rates

710

8.3.1.2 Inflation Forecasts Using Market Expectations of Interest Rates

713

8.3.2 A Critical Review of the Inflation Forecasting Exercises

718

8.3.2.1 Do Inflation Projections Qualify as an Intermediate Target of Monetary Policy?

718

8.3.2.2 Inflation Expectations and Central Bank Credibility

719

8.3.2.3 Optimism Bias

720

8.3.2.4 The Circularity Problem

720

8.3.2.5 The Potential for Confusion

721

8.4 Nominal Income Targeting (NIT)

721

8.4.1 Positive Demand Side Shock

722

8.4.2 Negative Demand Side Shock

722

8.4.3 Positive Supply Side Shock

723

8.4.4 Negative Supply Side Shock

723

8.4.5 A Critical Review of NIT

724

8.4.6 Comparing NIT with MT

726

8.5 The Taylor Rule

727

8.5.1 A Taylor Rule for the Swedish Riksbank

731

8.5.2 The Measurement Problems of the Taylor Rule

734

8.5.3 Does the Taylor Rule Qualify as a Policy Strategy?

738

8.5.4 Comparing the Taylor Rule with MT

740

8.6 The McCallum Rule

742

8.6.1 Calculating the McCallum Rule

743

8.6.2 Illustrations of the Basic McCallum Equation

744

8.6.3 Extensions of the McCallum Rule

746

8.6.4 Final Remarks

748

8.7 Interest Rate Targeting

748

8.7.1 Monetary Policy and the Neutral Real Interest Rate

749

8.7.2 Poole's Analysis of Interest Rate Targeting Versus Monetary Targeting

750

8.7.2.1 Positive Demand Shock Under Interest Rate Targeting

750

8.7.2.2 Money Demand Shock Under Monetary Targeting

751

8.7.3 Poole's Analysis in the Context of Stochastic Shocks

752

8.7.3.1 Basic Model

753

8.7.3.2 Control Errors for Broad Money

754

8.7.3.3 Base Money Adjustments

755

8.7.3.4 The Role of Variances for Optimal Policy

756

8.8 The Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)

757

8.9 Digression : How the ECB and the US Fed Set Interest Rates

759

8.8.0 Central Bank Reaction Function: The ''Taylor Rule''

760

8.8.0 Theory of the Taylor Rule

761

8.8.0 Empirical Evidence of the Taylor Rule

762

8.8.0 Simulations

769

8.8.0 Concluding Remarks

773

8.9 Digression II : Does the ECB Follow the Fed?

775

8.8.0 Motivation

776

8.8.0 ECB and Fed Interest Rate Setting -- First Prima Facie Evidence

778

8.8.0 Empirical Analysis

783

8.8.0.4 Preliminaries

784

8.8.0.4 Granger Causality?

786

8.8.0 Does the Relationship Change Over Time?

791

8.8.0.4 The Role of the 11th of September 2001: Evidence Based on GC Tests

792

8.8.0.4 Breaks Around the Turn-of-Year 2000/01? Evidence Based on GC Tests

795

8.8.0 Policy Conclusions

797

Index

808